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Brazil’s New Critical Minerals Law Reshapes Investment Rules

AN EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH:

292 September 2026, London (The Net-Zero Circle) Brazil has moved to treat critical minerals as a matter of national sovereignty. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva signed and published Law No. 15,506/2026, on 16 September 2026, creating the National Policy on Critical and Strategic Minerals (PNMCE) and a council known as CIMCE. The law aims to attract investment, but it also gives the Brazilian state a stronger role in deciding who can control mineral assets and where strategic materials can go.

The result is a new balance between global capital and domestic industrial policy. Brazil is not closing its mining sector to foreign investors. It is signalling that access to strategic resources may come with conditions, including local processing, supply-chain transparency and government review of important transactions.

A policy built around value inside Brazil

The law covers research, extraction, mineral processing, transformation and urban mining. Its stated purpose is to develop complete value chains in Brazil rather than rely mainly on exports of unprocessed materials. The government links the policy to batteries, energy storage, wind turbines, electric vehicles, semiconductors, digital equipment and defence technologies.

This focus matters because Brazil has large mineral resources but still captures limited value from some parts of the supply chain. Mining can create exports and employment, while refining, chemical conversion, component production and recycling can build deeper industrial capabilities. The law therefore gives priority to projects that add value, use local suppliers and develop research and innovation in Brazil.

What CIMCE can actually review

CIMCE is a national council linked to the Presidency. It will coordinate and monitor the PNMCE, define and update the list of critical and strategic minerals, identify priority projects and set guidelines for public support.

The most sensitive provision concerns companies holding mining rights for minerals classified as critical or strategic. The framework requires review of direct or indirect changes in corporate control, including changes made through a corporate reorganisation. It also covers foreign access to strategically important geological information, significant foreign participation or influence, certain international supply or offtake contracts, and the sale, transfer or encumbrance of mineral rights.

This is why the law has been described as creating an M&A “veto” power. The phrase captures the potential impact, but it needs qualification. The mechanism is not a blanket ban on all mergers or foreign investment. The CIMCE executive committee may decide that a transaction does not require approval, approve it without conditions, approve it with conditions, or deny it.

Foreign capital is still welcome, but less unrestricted

The new system does not prohibit foreign investment in Brazilian mining. It changes the risk calculation. A company acquiring a Brazilian mineral-rights holder may need to assess not only the asset, its geology and its permits, but also whether the mineral falls within the future CIMCE list and whether the transaction could affect economic or geopolitical security.

The law does not yet provide all the answers. The definition of a “significant” foreign stake or “significant” influence remains to be developed. Procedures and decision deadlines will also depend on future regulations and the council’s internal rules.

For investors, this creates uncertainty. A transaction may require a longer timetable, additional conditions or commitments to processing and supply within Brazil. However, the framework could favour long-term strategic investors willing to build local processing, research capacity and supply-chain partnerships. Clear rules will be essential if the policy is to attract capital rather than delay it.

Brazil is following a wider sovereignty trend

Brazil’s approach is part of a broader change in mineral policy. The European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 targets for domestic extraction, processing and recycling, while seeking to reduce dependence on any single foreign supplier. It also supports strategic projects, supply-chain monitoring and partnerships with third countries.

The United States has taken a similar security-led approach. Its 2026 Critical Minerals Ministerial focused on new supply sources, secure logistics, financing and cooperation with partner countries. Concentrated mineral markets can become tools of political pressure or supply disruption.

China has gone further in using export controls as a strategic instrument. A 2024 Ministry of Commerce notice prohibited, in principle, exports of gallium, germanium, antimony and certain superhard materials to the United States, while applying stricter checks to some graphite exports.

Governments increasingly want control over supply chains that support energy, technology, defence and industrial competitiveness. Brazil’s law places that debate inside the ownership and contract structure of mining projects.

The risk of resource nationalism

Brazil needs both sovereignty and investment. Developing lithium, rare earths, niobium, graphite and other strategic minerals requires international capital, expertise and equipment. A system that makes foreign participation too difficult could slow the industrial development the law seeks to promote.

The central test will be how CIMCE uses its powers. If decisions are transparent, time-limited and tied to clear national-development goals, screening could help Brazil secure local processing and technology partnerships. If the rules are unpredictable or politically driven, investors may demand a higher risk premium or choose competing jurisdictions.

What investors should watch next

Brazil has chosen a clear direction: foreign capital can participate, but critical mineral assets will be treated as part of its industrial and security policy. The PNMCE will succeed if that role produces more processing, innovation and resilient supply chains.

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